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With the development of the Chinese economic market and Chinese economic 
transactions, firms are full of enthusiasm about building relationships with government 
officials. Under such a background, political connections are becoming important issues. 
Seeking good political ties, as attested by many empirical studies, proved that political 
connections have relationships with the firm’s tax, donation, capital structure and so on. 
However, the objective of this study was to examine the relationship between political 
connections and the cost of debt, which is crucial for firms to develop because the main 
financial institutions are controlled by the government in China.   
 
In this study, the political connections issue revolved around the cost of debt in 100 
Chinese firms which were listed in the Shenzhen stock exchange in 2015. In addition, 
this study extended previous studies through an empirical study to examine the 
relationships between political connections and the cost of debt in China. A very 
interesting and new part in the research was introducing a new measurement of political 
connections. Besides using Faccio, Lang, and Young's (2001)  dummy variable as the 
measurement, this study also tested  the political connections from the Chinese national 
hierarchy positions. After using this new measurement, the result became more accurate 
and appropriate to Chinese social conditions.  
 
The result of this study shows that political connections and the cost of debt in China are 
significant and negative, which means in current China, firms are eager to request the 
government to be their patron. Therefore, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the 
board of directors (BOD) are willing to wear two hats—one is to carry the burden in the 
firm, and the is holding a position with political attributes. Moreover, this study enriches 
previous studies and makes contributions to this field. As the data and the duration are 
small, there are limitations to this study which provide a direction for future study.  
 
















Pasaran ekonomi dan transaksi ekonomi China yang berkembang telah mendorong 
hasrat firma bagimembina hubungan rasmi dengan kerajaan.. Berdasarkan hal ini, 
hubungan politik menjadi satu isu yang amat penting.. Banyak kajian empirikal 
membuktikan pentingnya dalam membina hubungan politik yang kukuh. Oleh itu, ini 
membuktikan bahawa rangkaian politik mempunyai hubungan dengan cukai firma, 
derma, struktur modal syarikat dan sebagainya. Walau bagaimanapun, objektif kajian ini 
adalah untuk menyiasat korelasi di antara hubungan politik dan kos debit. Hal ini amat 
penting bagi firma membangun kerana institusi kewangan utama dikawal oleh kerajaan 
di China. 
 
Dalam kajian ini, isu hubungan politik yang berkaitan dengan kos debit  di 100 buah 
syarikat China yang tersenarai di bursa saham Shenzhen pada tahun 2015 telah diteliti. 
Apatah lagi, kajian ini merupakan lanjutan  daripada kajian lepas. Menerusi kajian 
empirikal maka adalah perlu untuk meneroka kolerasi antara hubungan politik dengan 
kos debit di China. Perkara menarik dan baharu dalam penyelidikan ini adalah 
memperkenalkan satu pengukuran baharu dalam hubungan politik. Selain itu, kajian ini 
menerapkan pemboleh ubah semu yang dikemukakan oleh Faccio et al. (2001) sebagai 
ukuran. Kajian ini menguji hubungan politik daripada hierarki kedudukan kebangsaan 
China. Setelah penggunaan pengukuran baharu, maka hasil keputusan tersebut menjadi 
lebih tepat dan sesuai dengan keadaan sosial China. 
 
Dapatan  hasil kajian ini menunjukkan hubungan politik dan kos debit di China adalah 
penting dan berhubung negatif. Ini bermakna dalam situasi semasa di China, syarikat 
berhasrat menjadikan kerajaan sebagai penaung mereka. Oleh itu, Ketua Pegawai 
Eksekutif (CEO) atau lembaga pengarah syarikat sanggup mengalas lebih daripada satu 
tugas apabila mengambil beban dalam firma itu dan juga mempunyai kedudukan dalam 
politik. Tambahan lagi, kajian ini memperkayakan lagi kajian lepas dan memberi nafas 
yang baharu dalam bidang ini. Namun, disebabkan sampel data dan tempoh masa yang 
agak kecil, maka batasan kajian kekal muncul di dalam kajian ini dan memberi laluan 
bagi penambahbaikkan kajian pada masa depan. 
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1.1 Background of Study 
According to Krueger (1974) that firms were willing to spend time and money on 
dealing with government officials in order to boost their markets which in turn to 
promote the economy of the country. In addition, it was discovered that they asserted 
this kind of behavior could increase economic benefits. At time goes on, the world 
concerned economic growth through lower cost of debt. Thus, the relationship 
between firms and government had gradually become an attracting issue among 
researchers all over the world, especially in China. 
 
China has four unique features which make it so different compare to other countries 
in terms of government-firms relationship. The said relationship includes accelerated 
economic growth as compared to other emerging economies, where they obviously 
see China as a paradox case of “law–finance–growth”. This is because, even though 
the Chinese financial system is not well established, yet its economy is growing 
faster than other countries. Thus, Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) established that there 
must be existed selective institutional activities and governing mechanisms to fund 
economic growth, which includes reputation and relationships.  
 
The contents of 





to China but global. Other study can also add more theories in addition to 
rent-seeking relationship between government and business. Therefore, scholars need 
to examine political ties on the relationship between the political connections and the 
cost of debt. 
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